Updated auditing extension to v0.0.5

.github/workflows/phpunit-extensions.yml

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ permissions:
 jobs:
   phpunit-extensions:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    timeout-minutes: 15
+    timeout-minutes: 25
     strategy:
       matrix:
         postgres_version: [ 15, 16, 17 ]
@@ -132,5 +132,8 @@ jobs:
           php artisan key:generate
           php artisan passport:keys
 
-      - name: "Run PHPUnit"
+      - name: "Run PHPUnit (extensions)"
         run: php artisan test extensions/Billing/tests extensions/Services/tests extensions/Invoicing/tests --stop-on-failure
+
+      - name: "Run PHPUnit (core)"
+        run: php artisan test --testsuite=Unit,Feature --stop-on-failure

.oss-scanner/Dockerfile

@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
-# Build environment for Anthropic's OSS Scanner (https://github.com/anthropics/oss-scanner).
-# The scanner builds this image with the repository root as the build context and then audits it without network
-# access, so everything needed to run the app and its test suite (PHP + Composer deps, Node deps + built frontend,
-# a local PostgreSQL) is installed here.
-#
-# Inside the finished image:
-#   .oss-scanner/start-postgres.sh    start the local PostgreSQL server (required for tests and the app)
-#   php artisan test                  run the PHPUnit suite
-#   php artisan serve                 run the app on http://127.0.0.1:8000 (after `php artisan migrate --seed`)
-
-FROM node:20-bookworm-slim AS node
-
-FROM php:8.3-cli-bookworm
-
-ENV DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive \
-    COMPOSER_ALLOW_SUPERUSER=1 \
-    COMPOSER_NO_INTERACTION=1 \
-    TZ=UTC
-
-COPY --from=mlocati/php-extension-installer:2 /usr/bin/install-php-extensions /usr/local/bin/
-COPY --from=composer:2 /usr/bin/composer /usr/local/bin/composer
-COPY --from=node /usr/local/bin/node /usr/local/bin/node
-COPY --from=node /usr/local/lib/node_modules /usr/local/lib/node_modules
-RUN ln -s ../lib/node_modules/npm/bin/npm-cli.js /usr/local/bin/npm \
-    && ln -s ../lib/node_modules/npm/bin/npx-cli.js /usr/local/bin/npx
-
-# PostgreSQL 15 (Debian bookworm default) is the database solidtime runs and is tested against.
-RUN apt-get update \
-    && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends git unzip curl ca-certificates postgresql postgresql-client \
-    && install-php-extensions pdo_pgsql pgsql intl gd zip bcmath exif pcntl sockets soap \
-    && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* \
-    && echo "memory_limit=2G" > "$PHP_INI_DIR/conf.d/99-oss-scanner.ini"
-
-# Database matching .env.ci: user root / password root, database laravel.
-RUN pg_ctlcluster 15 main start \
-    && runuser -u postgres -- psql -c "CREATE ROLE root WITH LOGIN SUPERUSER PASSWORD 'root';" \
-    && runuser -u postgres -- createdb -O root laravel \
-    && pg_ctlcluster 15 main stop
-
-# scanner contract: the checkout lives inside the image, at /src
-COPY . /src
-WORKDIR /src
-
-RUN composer install --prefer-dist \
-    && npm ci \
-    && npm run build
-
-RUN cp .env.ci .env \
-    && php artisan key:generate \
-    && php artisan passport:keys --force \
-    && chmod +x .oss-scanner/start-postgres.sh
-
-# Run the test suite so the image is known to work, but do not fail the build on test failures.
-RUN .oss-scanner/start-postgres.sh \
-    && (php artisan test || echo "WARNING: PHPUnit reported failures") \
-    && pg_ctlcluster 15 main stop

.oss-scanner/Dockerfile.dockerignore

@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-# Used instead of the root .dockerignore when building .oss-scanner/Dockerfile. The root one is tailored to the
-# production image and excludes tests, phpunit.xml etc., which the scanner needs.
-node_modules
-extensions/*/node_modules
-vendor
-.env
-public/build
-public/hot
-storage/*.key
-storage/logs/*
-coverage
-test-results
-playwright-report
-.phpunit.cache
-.phpunit.result.cache
-auth.json
-.DS_Store
-.idea

.oss-scanner/start-postgres.sh

@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env bash
-# Start the local PostgreSQL server used by the test suite and the app (see .oss-scanner/Dockerfile).
-set -euo pipefail
-
-pg_ctlcluster 15 main start 2>/dev/null || true
-until pg_isready -h 127.0.0.1 -p 5432 -q; do sleep 0.5; done
-echo "PostgreSQL is running on 127.0.0.1:5432 (user root, password root, database laravel)"

.oss-scanner/threat_model.md

@@ -1,95 +0,0 @@
-# Threat model
-
-## What this project does
-
-solidtime is an open-source, multi-tenant time tracking web application (Laravel backend, Vue 3 + Inertia frontend,
-PostgreSQL). It runs as a hosted SaaS (solidtime.io) and is self-hosted by many organisations. Users belong to one or
-more **organizations**; inside an organization each member has a role: `owner`, `admin`, `manager`, `employee` or
-`placeholder` (an imported, non-login member). What each role may do is defined in `app/Service/PermissionStore.php`.
-
-The most important security property is **isolation**: a user must never read or modify data of an organization they
-are not a member of, and within an organization a member must not exceed the permissions of their role (e.g. an
-employee must not see other members' time entries, billable rates, or manage members, unless the organization settings
-explicitly allow it).
-
-## Trust boundaries
-
-- **Super admins are fully trusted.** They are the instance operators, configured via the `SUPER_ADMINS` env
-  variable, and have access to the Filament admin panel (`app/Filament`), which can view and change data of every
-  organization and impersonate users. Anything a super admin can do through the panel (including XSS, SQL injection,
-  SSRF or file access that is only reachable from the panel) is not a vulnerability.
-- What **is** in scope: a user who is not a super admin reaching the admin panel, or any of its actions, at all.
-- Operators of a self-hosted instance (shell, database, environment, filesystem access) are trusted.
-- Everyone else, including organization owners and admins when acting outside their own organization, is untrusted.
-
-## Where untrusted input enters
-
-All authenticated users, including employees of any organization and anyone who self-registers (registration is open
-by default), are untrusted.
-
-- **JSON API** `routes/api.php` (`/api/v1/...`), authenticated via Passport (session cookie or personal access token).
-  Most routes are scoped by `{organization}` and authorised in the controllers / form requests.
-- **Public, unauthenticated** endpoints: `GET /api/v1/public/reports` (shared reports, accessed by a secret), login,
-  registration, password reset, email verification, organization invitation acceptance (`routes/web.php`).
-- **Web / Inertia routes** `routes/web.php` and Fortify/Jetstream actions in `app/Actions`.
-- **Imports** (`app/Service/Import/Importers`): user-uploaded CSV and ZIP files from Toggl, Clockify, Harvest,
-  generic CSV and solidtime's own export format. ZIP handling is in `ZipImportHelper.php`.
-- **Exports / reports** (`app/Service/Export`, `app/Service/ReportExport`): CSV/XLSX/ODS and PDF. PDFs are rendered by
-  sending HTML to a Gotenberg (headless Chromium) service, so user-controlled content in that HTML matters.
-- **OAuth** (Passport) authorization and token endpoints.
-- **Filament admin panel** (`app/Filament`): only its access control is in scope (see Trust boundaries).
-
-## Components that matter most / least
-
-Most important: organization scoping and role checks in the API controllers, form requests (`app/Http/Requests`),
-`PermissionStore`, public report sharing, invitations and member management (role changes, ownership transfer, member
-merge), authentication flows (Fortify, 2FA, email change, API tokens), import parsing.
-
-Less important / out of scope:
-- `extensions/` is empty in this repository (proprietary modules are not part of the open-source code).
-- `docker/`, `k8s/`, `e2e/`, `playwright/`, `docs/` and developer tooling.
-- Third-party dependencies in `vendor/` and `node_modules/`, unless solidtime uses them in an unsafe way.
-
-## How to exercise it
-
-- `.oss-scanner/start-postgres.sh` starts the local PostgreSQL server (user `root`, password `root`, db `laravel`).
-- `php artisan test` runs the PHPUnit suite. Endpoint tests in `tests/Unit/Endpoint/Api/V1/` show how to create users,
-  organizations and members with factories and call the API with a given role; they are the quickest way to write a
-  reproducer. Example: `php artisan test --filter=TimeEntryEndpointTest`.
-- To run the app: `php artisan migrate:fresh --seed && php artisan serve` (http://127.0.0.1:8000). Note that the
-  test suite and the app share the same database.
-- There is no network: Gotenberg (PDF generation) and mail delivery are not available. Mail uses the `array`
-  driver in tests. The 8 PDF export tests in `TimeEntryEndpointTest` fail for this reason; that is expected.
-
-## How we rate severity
-
-- **Critical**: unauthenticated access to other users' data or accounts; authentication bypass; remote code execution;
-  SQL injection reachable by any registered user; reading or writing data of an organization the attacker is not a
-  member of.
-- **High**: privilege escalation within an organization (e.g. employee to admin/owner, or performing admin-only
-  actions); access to data the role must not see (other members' time entries, billable rates, member emails) when
-  the organization settings do not allow it; stored XSS that executes in another user's session; SSRF via PDF
-  rendering or imports; account takeover requiring user interaction.
-- **Medium**: information disclosure with limited impact, CSRF on state-changing endpoints, issues requiring an
-  unusual but realistic configuration, denial of service by a single authenticated request (e.g. pathological
-  import file).
-- **Low**: everything else with real security impact.
-
-## Anything to leave alone
-
-Please do not report (see also `SECURITY.md`):
-- Theoretical findings without a working reproducer.
-- Missing or weak security headers in isolation; TLS / mail DNS configuration.
-- Self-XSS; CSRF on non-state-changing endpoints (logout, theme).
-- CSV / spreadsheet formula injection in exports.
-- Owners or admins acting destructively within their own organization.
-- Anything requiring direct DB, shell or filesystem access on a self-hosted instance.
-- Anything that requires being a super admin, including issues inside the Filament admin panel.
-- Missing OAuth scope enforcement (not implemented yet).
-- Rate-limit tuning and generic DoS through volume of requests.
-
-## Reports and patches
-
-Please include the affected endpoint or code path, the attacker's role and the victim, a PHPUnit test (in the style of
-`tests/Unit/Endpoint/Api/V1/`) that reproduces the issue, and a minimal patch that follows the existing patterns
-(authorisation in form requests/controllers via `PermissionStore`).

extensions/manifest.json

@@ -9,10 +9,10 @@
     },
     "Invoicing": {
         "repository": "solidtime-io/extension-invoicing",
-        "ref": "v0.0.9"
+        "ref": "v0.0.10"
     },
     "Auditing": {
         "repository": "solidtime-io/extension-auditing",
-        "ref": "v0.0.4"
+        "ref": "v0.0.5"
     }
 }