Add OSS Scanner build environment and threat model

.oss-scanner/Dockerfile

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+# Build environment for Anthropic's OSS Scanner (https://github.com/anthropics/oss-scanner).
+# The scanner builds this image with the repository root as the build context and then audits it without network
+# access, so everything needed to run the app and its test suite (PHP + Composer deps, Node deps + built frontend,
+# a local PostgreSQL) is installed here.
+#
+# Inside the finished image:
+#   .oss-scanner/start-postgres.sh    start the local PostgreSQL server (required for tests and the app)
+#   php artisan test                  run the PHPUnit suite
+#   php artisan serve                 run the app on http://127.0.0.1:8000 (after `php artisan migrate --seed`)
+
+FROM node:20-bookworm-slim AS node
+
+FROM php:8.3-cli-bookworm
+
+ENV DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive \
+    COMPOSER_ALLOW_SUPERUSER=1 \
+    COMPOSER_NO_INTERACTION=1 \
+    TZ=UTC
+
+COPY --from=mlocati/php-extension-installer:2 /usr/bin/install-php-extensions /usr/local/bin/
+COPY --from=composer:2 /usr/bin/composer /usr/local/bin/composer
+COPY --from=node /usr/local/bin/node /usr/local/bin/node
+COPY --from=node /usr/local/lib/node_modules /usr/local/lib/node_modules
+RUN ln -s ../lib/node_modules/npm/bin/npm-cli.js /usr/local/bin/npm \
+    && ln -s ../lib/node_modules/npm/bin/npx-cli.js /usr/local/bin/npx
+
+# PostgreSQL 15 (Debian bookworm default) is the database solidtime runs and is tested against.
+RUN apt-get update \
+    && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends git unzip curl ca-certificates postgresql postgresql-client \
+    && install-php-extensions pdo_pgsql pgsql intl gd zip bcmath exif pcntl sockets soap \
+    && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* \
+    && echo "memory_limit=2G" > "$PHP_INI_DIR/conf.d/99-oss-scanner.ini"
+
+# Database matching .env.ci: user root / password root, database laravel.
+RUN pg_ctlcluster 15 main start \
+    && runuser -u postgres -- psql -c "CREATE ROLE root WITH LOGIN SUPERUSER PASSWORD 'root';" \
+    && runuser -u postgres -- createdb -O root laravel \
+    && pg_ctlcluster 15 main stop
+
+# scanner contract: the checkout lives inside the image, at /src
+COPY . /src
+WORKDIR /src
+
+RUN composer install --prefer-dist \
+    && npm ci \
+    && npm run build
+
+RUN cp .env.ci .env \
+    && php artisan key:generate \
+    && php artisan passport:keys --force \
+    && chmod +x .oss-scanner/start-postgres.sh
+
+# Run the test suite so the image is known to work, but do not fail the build on test failures.
+RUN .oss-scanner/start-postgres.sh \
+    && (php artisan test || echo "WARNING: PHPUnit reported failures") \
+    && pg_ctlcluster 15 main stop

.oss-scanner/Dockerfile.dockerignore

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+# Used instead of the root .dockerignore when building .oss-scanner/Dockerfile. The root one is tailored to the
+# production image and excludes tests, phpunit.xml etc., which the scanner needs.
+node_modules
+extensions/*/node_modules
+vendor
+.env
+public/build
+public/hot
+storage/*.key
+storage/logs/*
+coverage
+test-results
+playwright-report
+.phpunit.cache
+.phpunit.result.cache
+auth.json
+.DS_Store
+.idea

.oss-scanner/start-postgres.sh

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+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Start the local PostgreSQL server used by the test suite and the app (see .oss-scanner/Dockerfile).
+set -euo pipefail
+
+pg_ctlcluster 15 main start 2>/dev/null || true
+until pg_isready -h 127.0.0.1 -p 5432 -q; do sleep 0.5; done
+echo "PostgreSQL is running on 127.0.0.1:5432 (user root, password root, database laravel)"

.oss-scanner/threat_model.md

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+# Threat model
+
+## What this project does
+
+solidtime is an open-source, multi-tenant time tracking web application (Laravel backend, Vue 3 + Inertia frontend,
+PostgreSQL). It runs as a hosted SaaS (solidtime.io) and is self-hosted by many organisations. Users belong to one or
+more **organizations**; inside an organization each member has a role: `owner`, `admin`, `manager`, `employee` or
+`placeholder` (an imported, non-login member). What each role may do is defined in `app/Service/PermissionStore.php`.
+
+The most important security property is **isolation**: a user must never read or modify data of an organization they
+are not a member of, and within an organization a member must not exceed the permissions of their role (e.g. an
+employee must not see other members' time entries, billable rates, or manage members, unless the organization settings
+explicitly allow it).
+
+## Where untrusted input enters
+
+All authenticated users, including employees of any organization and anyone who self-registers (registration is open
+by default), are untrusted.
+
+- **JSON API** `routes/api.php` (`/api/v1/...`), authenticated via Passport (session cookie or personal access token).
+  Most routes are scoped by `{organization}` and authorised in the controllers / form requests.
+- **Public, unauthenticated** endpoints: `GET /api/v1/public/reports` (shared reports, accessed by a secret), login,
+  registration, password reset, email verification, organization invitation acceptance (`routes/web.php`).
+- **Web / Inertia routes** `routes/web.php` and Fortify/Jetstream actions in `app/Actions`.
+- **Imports** (`app/Service/Import/Importers`): user-uploaded CSV and ZIP files from Toggl, Clockify, Harvest,
+  generic CSV and solidtime's own export format. ZIP handling is in `ZipImportHelper.php`.
+- **Exports / reports** (`app/Service/Export`, `app/Service/ReportExport`): CSV/XLSX/ODS and PDF. PDFs are rendered by
+  sending HTML to a Gotenberg (headless Chromium) service, so user-controlled content in that HTML matters.
+- **OAuth** (Passport) authorization and token endpoints.
+- **Filament admin panel** (`app/Filament`), only for instance super admins (`SUPER_ADMINS` env). Super admins are
+  trusted.
+
+## Components that matter most / least
+
+Most important: organization scoping and role checks in the API controllers, form requests (`app/Http/Requests`),
+`PermissionStore`, public report sharing, invitations and member management (role changes, ownership transfer, member
+merge), authentication flows (Fortify, 2FA, email change, API tokens), import parsing.
+
+Less important / out of scope:
+- `extensions/` is empty in this repository (proprietary modules are not part of the open-source code).
+- `docker/`, `k8s/`, `e2e/`, `playwright/`, `docs/` and developer tooling.
+- Third-party dependencies in `vendor/` and `node_modules/`, unless solidtime uses them in an unsafe way.
+
+## How to exercise it
+
+- `.oss-scanner/start-postgres.sh` starts the local PostgreSQL server (user `root`, password `root`, db `laravel`).
+- `php artisan test` runs the PHPUnit suite. Endpoint tests in `tests/Unit/Endpoint/Api/V1/` show how to create users,
+  organizations and members with factories and call the API with a given role; they are the quickest way to write a
+  reproducer. Example: `php artisan test --filter=TimeEntryEndpointTest`.
+- To run the app: `php artisan migrate:fresh --seed && php artisan serve` (http://127.0.0.1:8000). Note that the
+  test suite and the app share the same database.
+- There is no network: Gotenberg (PDF generation) and mail delivery are not available. Mail uses the `array`
+  driver in tests. The 8 PDF export tests in `TimeEntryEndpointTest` fail for this reason; that is expected.
+
+## How we rate severity
+
+- **Critical**: unauthenticated access to other users' data or accounts; authentication bypass; remote code execution;
+  SQL injection reachable by any registered user; reading or writing data of an organization the attacker is not a
+  member of.
+- **High**: privilege escalation within an organization (e.g. employee to admin/owner, or performing admin-only
+  actions); access to data the role must not see (other members' time entries, billable rates, member emails) when
+  the organization settings do not allow it; stored XSS that executes in another user's session; SSRF via PDF
+  rendering or imports; account takeover requiring user interaction.
+- **Medium**: information disclosure with limited impact, CSRF on state-changing endpoints, issues requiring an
+  unusual but realistic configuration, denial of service by a single authenticated request (e.g. pathological
+  import file).
+- **Low**: everything else with real security impact.
+
+## Anything to leave alone
+
+Please do not report (see also `SECURITY.md`):
+- Theoretical findings without a working reproducer.
+- Missing or weak security headers in isolation; TLS / mail DNS configuration.
+- Self-XSS; CSRF on non-state-changing endpoints (logout, theme).
+- CSV / spreadsheet formula injection in exports.
+- Owners or admins acting destructively within their own organization.
+- Anything requiring direct DB, shell or filesystem access on a self-hosted instance, or super admin access.
+- Missing OAuth scope enforcement (not implemented yet).
+- Rate-limit tuning and generic DoS through volume of requests.
+
+## Reports and patches
+
+Please include the affected endpoint or code path, the attacker's role and the victim, a PHPUnit test (in the style of
+`tests/Unit/Endpoint/Api/V1/`) that reproduces the issue, and a minimal patch that follows the existing patterns
+(authorisation in form requests/controllers via `PermissionStore`).