Add OSS Scanner build environment and threat model

.oss-scanner/threat_model.md

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+# Threat model
+
+## What this project does
+
+solidtime is an open-source, multi-tenant time tracking web application (Laravel backend, Vue 3 + Inertia frontend,
+PostgreSQL). It runs as a hosted SaaS (solidtime.io) and is self-hosted by many organisations. Users belong to one or
+more **organizations**; inside an organization each member has a role: `owner`, `admin`, `manager`, `employee` or
+`placeholder` (an imported, non-login member). What each role may do is defined in `app/Service/PermissionStore.php`.
+
+The most important security property is **isolation**: a user must never read or modify data of an organization they
+are not a member of, and within an organization a member must not exceed the permissions of their role (e.g. an
+employee must not see other members' time entries, billable rates, or manage members, unless the organization settings
+explicitly allow it).
+
+## Where untrusted input enters
+
+All authenticated users, including employees of any organization and anyone who self-registers (registration is open
+by default), are untrusted.
+
+- **JSON API** `routes/api.php` (`/api/v1/...`), authenticated via Passport (session cookie or personal access token).
+  Most routes are scoped by `{organization}` and authorised in the controllers / form requests.
+- **Public, unauthenticated** endpoints: `GET /api/v1/public/reports` (shared reports, accessed by a secret), login,
+  registration, password reset, email verification, organization invitation acceptance (`routes/web.php`).
+- **Web / Inertia routes** `routes/web.php` and Fortify/Jetstream actions in `app/Actions`.
+- **Imports** (`app/Service/Import/Importers`): user-uploaded CSV and ZIP files from Toggl, Clockify, Harvest,
+  generic CSV and solidtime's own export format. ZIP handling is in `ZipImportHelper.php`.
+- **Exports / reports** (`app/Service/Export`, `app/Service/ReportExport`): CSV/XLSX/ODS and PDF. PDFs are rendered by
+  sending HTML to a Gotenberg (headless Chromium) service, so user-controlled content in that HTML matters.
+- **OAuth** (Passport) authorization and token endpoints.
+- **Filament admin panel** (`app/Filament`), only for instance super admins (`SUPER_ADMINS` env). Super admins are
+  trusted.
+
+## Components that matter most / least
+
+Most important: organization scoping and role checks in the API controllers, form requests (`app/Http/Requests`),
+`PermissionStore`, public report sharing, invitations and member management (role changes, ownership transfer, member
+merge), authentication flows (Fortify, 2FA, email change, API tokens), import parsing.
+
+Less important / out of scope:
+- `extensions/` is empty in this repository (proprietary modules are not part of the open-source code).
+- `docker/`, `k8s/`, `e2e/`, `playwright/`, `docs/` and developer tooling.
+- Third-party dependencies in `vendor/` and `node_modules/`, unless solidtime uses them in an unsafe way.
+
+## How to exercise it
+
+- `.oss-scanner/start-postgres.sh` starts the local PostgreSQL server (user `root`, password `root`, db `laravel`).
+- `php artisan test` runs the PHPUnit suite. Endpoint tests in `tests/Unit/Endpoint/Api/V1/` show how to create users,
+  organizations and members with factories and call the API with a given role; they are the quickest way to write a
+  reproducer. Example: `php artisan test --filter=TimeEntryEndpointTest`.
+- To run the app: `php artisan migrate:fresh --seed && php artisan serve` (http://127.0.0.1:8000). Note that the
+  test suite and the app share the same database.
+- There is no network: Gotenberg (PDF generation) and mail delivery are not available. Mail uses the `array`
+  driver in tests. The 8 PDF export tests in `TimeEntryEndpointTest` fail for this reason; that is expected.
+
+## How we rate severity
+
+- **Critical**: unauthenticated access to other users' data or accounts; authentication bypass; remote code execution;
+  SQL injection reachable by any registered user; reading or writing data of an organization the attacker is not a
+  member of.
+- **High**: privilege escalation within an organization (e.g. employee to admin/owner, or performing admin-only
+  actions); access to data the role must not see (other members' time entries, billable rates, member emails) when
+  the organization settings do not allow it; stored XSS that executes in another user's session; SSRF via PDF
+  rendering or imports; account takeover requiring user interaction.
+- **Medium**: information disclosure with limited impact, CSRF on state-changing endpoints, issues requiring an
+  unusual but realistic configuration, denial of service by a single authenticated request (e.g. pathological
+  import file).
+- **Low**: everything else with real security impact.
+
+## Anything to leave alone
+
+Please do not report (see also `SECURITY.md`):
+- Theoretical findings without a working reproducer.
+- Missing or weak security headers in isolation; TLS / mail DNS configuration.
+- Self-XSS; CSRF on non-state-changing endpoints (logout, theme).
+- CSV / spreadsheet formula injection in exports.
+- Owners or admins acting destructively within their own organization.
+- Anything requiring direct DB, shell or filesystem access on a self-hosted instance, or super admin access.
+- Missing OAuth scope enforcement (not implemented yet).
+- Rate-limit tuning and generic DoS through volume of requests.
+
+## Reports and patches
+
+Please include the affected endpoint or code path, the attacker's role and the victim, a PHPUnit test (in the style of
+`tests/Unit/Endpoint/Api/V1/`) that reproduces the issue, and a minimal patch that follows the existing patterns
+(authorisation in form requests/controllers via `PermissionStore`).