gotenberg/pkg/gotenberg/outbound_test.go

package gotenberg

import (
	"context"
	"errors"
	"net/http"
	"net/netip"
	"strings"
	"testing"
	"time"

	"github.com/dlclark/regexp2"
)

func TestIsPublicIP(t *testing.T) {
	for _, tc := range []struct {
		addr   string
		public bool
	}{
		// Public.
		{"1.1.1.1", true},
		{"8.8.8.8", true},
		{"2606:4700:4700::1111", true},

		// Loopback.
		{"127.0.0.1", false},
		{"127.255.255.254", false},
		{"::1", false},

		// IPv4-mapped IPv6 (Issue 2).
		{"::ffff:127.0.0.1", false},
		{"::ffff:10.0.0.1", false},
		{"::ffff:169.254.169.254", false},

		// RFC1918.
		{"10.0.0.1", false},
		{"172.16.0.1", false},
		{"172.31.255.254", false},
		{"192.168.1.1", false},

		// Link-local.
		{"169.254.169.254", false},
		{"169.254.170.2", false},

		// Carrier-grade NAT (RFC 6598). Alibaba Cloud serves instance
		// metadata from 100.100.100.200.
		{"100.64.0.0", false},
		{"100.100.100.200", false},
		{"100.127.255.255", false},
		{"::ffff:100.100.100.200", false},

		// Benchmarking (RFC 2544).
		{"198.18.0.1", false},
		{"198.19.255.255", false},

		// Adjacent to the ranges above, and public.
		{"100.63.255.255", true},
		{"100.128.0.0", true},
		{"198.17.255.255", true},
		{"198.20.0.0", true},
		{"fe80::1", false},

		// Unique-local.
		{"fc00::1", false},
		{"fd12:3456:789a::1", false},

		// Unspecified.
		{"0.0.0.0", false},
		{"::", false},

		// Multicast.
		{"224.0.0.1", false},
		{"ff02::1", false},

		// 6to4 wrapping internal/private IPv4 (RFC 3056, deprecated by
		// RFC 7526). a9fe:a9fe = 169.254.169.254 (cloud metadata).
		{"2002:a9fe:a9fe::", false},
		{"2002:0a00:0001::", false},
		{"2002:c0a8:0101::", false},

		// 6to4 wrapping a public IPv4 (8.8.8.8) is rejected wholesale.
		{"2002:0808:0808::", false},

		// NAT64 well-known prefix (RFC 6052).
		{"64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe", false},
		{"64:ff9b::0808:0808", false},

		// NAT64 local-use prefix (RFC 8215).
		{"64:ff9b:1::a9fe:a9fe", false},

		// Teredo (RFC 4380).
		{"2001:0:abcd:ef12:3456:7890:a9fe:a9fe", false},

		// Deprecated site-local (RFC 3879).
		{"fec0::1", false},
		{"feff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff", false},

		// IPv4-compatible IPv6 (deprecated, not handled by Unmap).
		{"::a9fe:a9fe", false},

		// Documentation prefix (RFC 3849).
		{"2001:db8::1", false},

		// Discard prefix (RFC 6666).
		{"100::1", false},
	} {
		t.Run(tc.addr, func(t *testing.T) {
			addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(tc.addr)
			if err != nil {
				t.Fatalf("parse %q: %v", tc.addr, err)
			}
			if got := IsPublicIP(addr); got != tc.public {
				t.Fatalf("IsPublicIP(%q) = %v, want %v", tc.addr, got, tc.public)
			}
		})
	}
}

// stubResolver lets tests fake DNS lookups in [ResolveAndCheckPublic].
type stubResolver struct {
	lookup func(host string) ([]netip.Addr, error)
}

func (s stubResolver) LookupNetIP(_ context.Context, _, host string) ([]netip.Addr, error) {
	return s.lookup(host)
}

func withStubResolver(t *testing.T, fn func(host string) ([]netip.Addr, error)) {
	t.Helper()
	prev := outboundResolver
	outboundResolver = stubResolver{lookup: fn}
	t.Cleanup(func() { outboundResolver = prev })
}

func mustAddrs(t *testing.T, ss ...string) []netip.Addr {
	t.Helper()
	out := make([]netip.Addr, 0, len(ss))
	for _, s := range ss {
		a, err := netip.ParseAddr(s)
		if err != nil {
			t.Fatalf("parse %q: %v", s, err)
		}
		out = append(out, a)
	}
	return out
}

func TestFilterOutboundURL(t *testing.T) {
	defaultDeny := []*regexp2.Regexp{
		regexp2.MustCompile(`^https?://(10\.|172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[01])\.|192\.168\.|169\.254\.|0\.0\.0\.0|127\.|localhost|\[::1\]|\[fd)`, 0),
	}
	chromiumDeny := []*regexp2.Regexp{
		regexp2.MustCompile(`^file:(?!//\/tmp/).*`, 0),
	}

	for _, tc := range []struct {
		scenario     string
		rawURL       string
		allow        []*regexp2.Regexp
		deny         []*regexp2.Regexp
		opts         []DecideOption
		stub         func(host string) ([]netip.Addr, error)
		expectErr    bool
		expectIs     error
		expectErrMsg string
	}{
		{
			scenario:  "public IP literal passes",
			rawURL:    "https://1.1.1.1/",
			deny:      defaultDeny,
			expectErr: false,
		},
		{
			scenario:  "loopback IP literal blocked by default deny-list",
			rawURL:    "http://127.0.0.1:8080/",
			deny:      defaultDeny,
			expectErr: true,
			expectIs:  ErrFiltered,
		},
		{
			scenario:  "Issue 4: uppercase scheme normalized then blocked by deny-list",
			rawURL:    "HTTP://127.0.0.1:8080/",
			deny:      defaultDeny,
			expectErr: true,
			expectIs:  ErrFiltered,
		},
		{
			scenario:  "Issue 2: IPv4-mapped IPv6 evades deny-list but blocked by IP check",
			rawURL:    "http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:8080/page.pdf",
			deny:      defaultDeny,
			opts:      []DecideOption{WithDenyPrivateIPs(true)},
			expectErr: true,
			expectIs:  ErrFiltered,
		},
		{
			scenario:  "Issue 2: IPv4-mapped IPv6 to RFC1918 blocked by IP check",
			rawURL:    "http://[::ffff:10.0.0.1]/",
			deny:      defaultDeny,
			opts:      []DecideOption{WithDenyPrivateIPs(true)},
			expectErr: true,
			expectIs:  ErrFiltered,
		},
		{
			scenario:  "hostname resolving to public IP passes with deny-private-ips",
			rawURL:    "https://example.com/",
			deny:      defaultDeny,
			opts:      []DecideOption{WithDenyPrivateIPs(true)},
			stub:      func(string) ([]netip.Addr, error) { return mustAddrs(t, "93.184.216.34"), nil },
			expectErr: false,
		},
		{
			scenario:  "hostname resolving to loopback blocked with deny-private-ips",
			rawURL:    "https://rebind.example/",
			deny:      defaultDeny,
			opts:      []DecideOption{WithDenyPrivateIPs(true)},
			stub:      func(string) ([]netip.Addr, error) { return mustAddrs(t, "127.0.0.1"), nil },
			expectErr: true,
			expectIs:  ErrFiltered,
		},
		{
			scenario:  "hostname resolving to mixed public+private blocked with deny-private-ips",
			rawURL:    "https://mixed.example/",
			deny:      defaultDeny,
			opts:      []DecideOption{WithDenyPrivateIPs(true)},
			stub:      func(string) ([]netip.Addr, error) { return mustAddrs(t, "1.1.1.1", "10.0.0.1"), nil },
			expectErr: true,
			expectIs:  ErrFiltered,
		},
		{
			scenario:  "allow-list match bypasses IP check",
			rawURL:    "http://internal.service/api",
			allow:     []*regexp2.Regexp{regexp2.MustCompile(`^http://internal\.service`, 0)},
			deny:      defaultDeny,
			opts:      []DecideOption{WithDenyPrivateIPs(true)},
			expectErr: false,
		},
		{
			scenario:  "deny-list still wins over allow-list match",
			rawURL:    "http://internal.service/api",
			allow:     []*regexp2.Regexp{regexp2.MustCompile(`^http://internal`, 0)},
			deny:      []*regexp2.Regexp{regexp2.MustCompile(`/api$`, 0)},
			expectErr: true,
			expectIs:  ErrFiltered,
		},
		{
			scenario:  "allow-list non-empty and no match rejects",
			rawURL:    "https://other.example/",
			allow:     []*regexp2.Regexp{regexp2.MustCompile(`^https://allowed\.example`, 0)},
			expectErr: true,
			expectIs:  ErrFiltered,
		},
		{
			scenario:  "file:// allowed under tmp passes Chromium default",
			rawURL:    "file:///tmp/index.html",
			deny:      chromiumDeny,
			expectErr: false,
		},
		{
			scenario:  "file:// outside tmp blocked by Chromium default",
			rawURL:    "file:///etc/passwd",
			deny:      chromiumDeny,
			expectErr: true,
			expectIs:  ErrFiltered,
		},
		{
			scenario:  "Chromium default permissive passes http to public host",
			rawURL:    "https://example.com/",
			deny:      chromiumDeny,
			stub:      func(string) ([]netip.Addr, error) { return mustAddrs(t, "93.184.216.34"), nil },
			expectErr: false,
		},
		{
			scenario:  "Chromium with deny-private-ips blocks http to loopback",
			rawURL:    "http://127.0.0.1:3000/health",
			deny:      chromiumDeny,
			opts:      []DecideOption{WithDenyPrivateIPs(true)},
			expectErr: true,
			expectIs:  ErrFiltered,
		},
		{
			scenario:  "Chromium with deny-private-ips blocks cloud metadata",
			rawURL:    "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/",
			deny:      chromiumDeny,
			opts:      []DecideOption{WithDenyPrivateIPs(true)},
			expectErr: true,
			expectIs:  ErrFiltered,
		},
		{
			scenario:  "data: URL passes (non-network scheme)",
			rawURL:    "data:text/html;base64,PGgxPmhpPC9oMT4=",
			expectErr: false,
		},
		{
			scenario:  "URL with no host rejected",
			rawURL:    "http:///path",
			expectErr: true,
			expectIs:  ErrFiltered,
		},
		{
			scenario:  "userinfo cannot mask host when deny-private-ips enabled",
			rawURL:    "http://example.com@127.0.0.1/",
			deny:      defaultDeny,
			opts:      []DecideOption{WithDenyPrivateIPs(true)},
			expectErr: true,
			expectIs:  ErrFiltered,
		},
	} {
		t.Run(tc.scenario, func(t *testing.T) {
			if tc.stub != nil {
				withStubResolver(t, tc.stub)
			} else {
				// Default: any DNS lookup in a non-stubbed test is a bug.
				withStubResolver(t, func(host string) ([]netip.Addr, error) {
					t.Fatalf("unexpected DNS lookup for %q", host)
					return nil, nil
				})
			}

			err := FilterOutboundURL(context.Background(), tc.rawURL, tc.allow, tc.deny, time.Now().Add(5*time.Second), tc.opts...)

			if tc.expectErr && err == nil {
				t.Fatalf("expected error, got nil")
			}
			if !tc.expectErr && err != nil {
				t.Fatalf("expected no error, got: %v", err)
			}
			if tc.expectIs != nil && !errors.Is(err, tc.expectIs) {
				t.Fatalf("expected error to wrap %v, got: %v", tc.expectIs, err)
			}
		})
	}
}

func TestDecideOutbound_UnresolvableHostFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
	withStubResolver(t, func(string) ([]netip.Addr, error) {
		return nil, errors.New("no such host")
	})

	// An alternate IP encoding (decimal for 127.0.0.1) that the resolver
	// rejects as a hostname must fail closed as filtered, not surface as a
	// server error, so clients receive a generic 403.
	_, err := DecideOutbound(context.Background(), "http://2130706433/", nil, nil, time.Now().Add(5*time.Second), WithDenyPrivateIPs(true))
	if !errors.Is(err, ErrFiltered) {
		t.Fatalf("expected ErrFiltered, got: %v", err)
	}
}

func TestDecideOutbound_ResolverCancellationNotFiltered(t *testing.T) {
	withStubResolver(t, func(string) ([]netip.Addr, error) {
		return nil, context.Canceled
	})

	// A cancellation or timeout is not a policy decision and must not be
	// reported as a filtered request.
	_, err := DecideOutbound(context.Background(), "http://example.com/", nil, nil, time.Now().Add(5*time.Second), WithDenyPrivateIPs(true))
	if err == nil {
		t.Fatal("expected error, got nil")
	}
	if errors.Is(err, ErrFiltered) {
		t.Fatalf("cancellation must not be filtered, got: %v", err)
	}
	if !errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
		t.Fatalf("expected context.Canceled, got: %v", err)
	}
}

func TestResolveAndCheckPublic_IPLiteralLoopback(t *testing.T) {
	withStubResolver(t, func(host string) ([]netip.Addr, error) {
		t.Fatalf("unexpected DNS lookup for %q", host)
		return nil, nil
	})

	_, err := ResolveAndCheckPublic(context.Background(), "127.0.0.1")
	if !errors.Is(err, ErrNonPublicIP) {
		t.Fatalf("expected ErrNonPublicIP, got: %v", err)
	}
}

func TestResolveAndCheckPublic_HostResolvesToLoopback(t *testing.T) {
	withStubResolver(t, func(host string) ([]netip.Addr, error) {
		return mustAddrs(t, "127.0.0.1"), nil
	})

	_, err := ResolveAndCheckPublic(context.Background(), "rebind.example")
	if !errors.Is(err, ErrNonPublicIP) {
		t.Fatalf("expected ErrNonPublicIP, got: %v", err)
	}
}

func TestResolveAndCheckPublic_HostResolvesToPublic(t *testing.T) {
	withStubResolver(t, func(host string) ([]netip.Addr, error) {
		return mustAddrs(t, "1.1.1.1"), nil
	})

	addrs, err := ResolveAndCheckPublic(context.Background(), "example.com")
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
	}
	if len(addrs) != 1 || addrs[0].String() != "1.1.1.1" {
		t.Fatalf("expected [1.1.1.1], got: %v", addrs)
	}
}

func TestDecideOutbound_DenyPrivateIPs_RejectsLoopbackLiteral(t *testing.T) {
	withStubResolver(t, func(host string) ([]netip.Addr, error) {
		t.Fatalf("unexpected DNS lookup for %q", host)
		return nil, nil
	})

	_, err := DecideOutbound(
		context.Background(),
		"http://127.0.0.1:8080/",
		nil, nil,
		time.Now().Add(5*time.Second),
		WithDenyPrivateIPs(true),
	)
	if !errors.Is(err, ErrFiltered) {
		t.Fatalf("WithDenyPrivateIPs(true) must reject loopback literal, got: %v", err)
	}
}

func TestDecideOutbound_DenyPrivateIPs_AllowsPublic(t *testing.T) {
	withStubResolver(t, func(host string) ([]netip.Addr, error) {
		return mustAddrs(t, "93.184.216.34"), nil
	})

	decision, err := DecideOutbound(
		context.Background(),
		"http://example.com/",
		nil, nil,
		time.Now().Add(5*time.Second),
		WithDenyPrivateIPs(true),
	)
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("expected no error for public host, got: %v", err)
	}
	if len(decision.Pinned) != 1 || decision.Pinned[0].String() != "93.184.216.34" {
		t.Fatalf("decision.Pinned = %v, want [93.184.216.34]", decision.Pinned)
	}
}

func TestDecideOutbound_DenyPublicIPs_RejectsPublic(t *testing.T) {
	withStubResolver(t, func(host string) ([]netip.Addr, error) {
		return mustAddrs(t, "1.1.1.1"), nil
	})

	_, err := DecideOutbound(
		context.Background(),
		"http://example.com/",
		nil, nil,
		time.Now().Add(5*time.Second),
		WithDenyPublicIPs(true),
	)
	if !errors.Is(err, ErrFiltered) {
		t.Fatalf("WithDenyPublicIPs(true) must reject public host, got: %v", err)
	}
}

func TestDecideOutbound_DenyPublicIPs_AllowsPrivate(t *testing.T) {
	withStubResolver(t, func(host string) ([]netip.Addr, error) {
		return mustAddrs(t, "10.0.0.5"), nil
	})

	decision, err := DecideOutbound(
		context.Background(),
		"http://internal.svc/",
		nil, nil,
		time.Now().Add(5*time.Second),
		WithDenyPublicIPs(true),
	)
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("expected no error for private host, got: %v", err)
	}
	if len(decision.Pinned) != 1 || decision.Pinned[0].String() != "10.0.0.5" {
		t.Fatalf("decision.Pinned = %v, want [10.0.0.5]", decision.Pinned)
	}
}

func TestDecideOutbound_DenyBoth_WhitelistOnly(t *testing.T) {
	withStubResolver(t, func(host string) ([]netip.Addr, error) {
		return mustAddrs(t, "1.1.1.1"), nil
	})

	// Both denies active and no allow-list match: every resolved address
	// fails. Only an allow-list match can permit a destination under
	// this posture.
	_, err := DecideOutbound(
		context.Background(),
		"http://example.com/",
		nil, nil,
		time.Now().Add(5*time.Second),
		WithDenyPrivateIPs(true),
		WithDenyPublicIPs(true),
	)
	if !errors.Is(err, ErrFiltered) {
		t.Fatalf("expected ErrFiltered with both denies enabled, got: %v", err)
	}
}

func TestDecideOutbound_DenyLists_WinOverDenyPrivateIPs(t *testing.T) {
	withStubResolver(t, func(host string) ([]netip.Addr, error) {
		t.Fatalf("unexpected DNS lookup for %q", host)
		return nil, nil
	})

	// The regex deny-list fires before any resolution; verifies that
	// operator-supplied deny patterns remain effective regardless of
	// IP-class options.
	deny := []*regexp2.Regexp{regexp2.MustCompile(`^http://evil\.`, 0)}

	_, err := DecideOutbound(
		context.Background(),
		"http://evil.local/",
		nil, deny,
		time.Now().Add(5*time.Second),
		WithDenyPrivateIPs(true),
	)
	if !errors.Is(err, ErrFiltered) {
		t.Fatalf("deny-list must still reject, got: %v", err)
	}
}

func TestDecideOutbound_Permissive_AllowsPrivate(t *testing.T) {
	withStubResolver(t, func(host string) ([]netip.Addr, error) {
		return mustAddrs(t, "10.0.0.5"), nil
	})

	// No options passed: default posture is permissive across both
	// IP classes. The caller still gets pinned IPs for dial safety.
	decision, err := DecideOutbound(
		context.Background(),
		"http://internal.svc/",
		nil, nil,
		time.Now().Add(5*time.Second),
	)
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("permissive default must allow private host, got: %v", err)
	}
	if len(decision.Pinned) != 1 || decision.Pinned[0].String() != "10.0.0.5" {
		t.Fatalf("decision.Pinned = %v, want [10.0.0.5]", decision.Pinned)
	}
}

// privateIPsDenyList is the textual private-IP deny-list that shipped as the
// default for api-download-from-deny-list and webhook-deny-list in v8.31.0 and
// is still published as a migration recipe. Every alternative is anchored on
// "://", so userinfo used to slide the private address past the anchor.
const privateIPsDenyList = `^https?://(10\.|172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[01])\.|192\.168\.|169\.254\.|0\.0\.0\.0|127\.|localhost|\[::1\]|\[fd)`

func TestDecideOutbound_UserinfoDoesNotEvadeDenyList(t *testing.T) {
	for _, rawURL := range []string{
		"http://127.0.0.1:9999/",
		"http://a@127.0.0.1:9999/",
		"http://@127.0.0.1:9999/",
		"http://:@127.0.0.1:9999/",
		"http://%61@127.0.0.1:9999/",
		"http://user:pass@127.0.0.1:9999/",
		"HTTP://A@127.0.0.1:9999/",
		"http://a@169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/",
		// url.Parse takes the last "@" as the userinfo separator, so the host
		// here is the second literal.
		"http://a@127.0.0.1:9999@127.0.0.1:9999/",
	} {
		t.Run(rawURL, func(t *testing.T) {
			withStubResolver(t, func(host string) ([]netip.Addr, error) {
				t.Fatalf("unexpected DNS lookup for %q: the deny-list must reject before resolution", host)
				return nil, nil
			})

			// Deny-list only, with the permissive IP defaults the modules ship.
			_, err := DecideOutbound(
				context.Background(),
				rawURL,
				nil,
				[]*regexp2.Regexp{regexp2.MustCompile(privateIPsDenyList, 0)},
				time.Now().Add(5*time.Second),
			)
			if !errors.Is(err, ErrFiltered) {
				t.Fatalf("userinfo must not evade the deny-list, got: %v", err)
			}
		})
	}
}

func TestDecideOutbound_UserinfoDoesNotSatisfyAllowList(t *testing.T) {
	// A host-terminated allow-list, the shape the documentation recommends.
	allowList := []*regexp2.Regexp{regexp2.MustCompile(`^https://trusted\.example\.com(:[0-9]+)?(/|$)`, 0)}

	for _, rawURL := range []string{
		"https://trusted.example.com@169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/",
		"https://trusted.example.com@10.0.0.5/",
		"https://trusted.example.com:443@10.0.0.5/",
	} {
		t.Run(rawURL, func(t *testing.T) {
			withStubResolver(t, func(host string) ([]netip.Addr, error) {
				return mustAddrs(t, "10.0.0.5"), nil
			})

			decision, err := DecideOutbound(
				context.Background(),
				rawURL,
				allowList, nil,
				time.Now().Add(5*time.Second),
				WithDenyPrivateIPs(true),
			)
			if err == nil {
				t.Fatalf("userinfo must not satisfy the allow-list, got decision %+v", decision)
			}
			if decision.Bypass {
				t.Fatal("userinfo must never produce a bypass")
			}
		})
	}
}

func TestDecideOutbound_UserinfoKeptOutOfErrorMessages(t *testing.T) {
	withStubResolver(t, func(host string) ([]netip.Addr, error) {
		t.Fatalf("unexpected DNS lookup for %q", host)
		return nil, nil
	})

	_, err := DecideOutbound(
		context.Background(),
		"http://alice:hunter2@127.0.0.1:9999/",
		nil,
		[]*regexp2.Regexp{regexp2.MustCompile(privateIPsDenyList, 0)},
		time.Now().Add(5*time.Second),
	)
	if err == nil {
		t.Fatal("expected the URL to be filtered")
	}
	if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "hunter2") || strings.Contains(err.Error(), "alice") {
		t.Fatalf("error message must not leak URL credentials: %v", err)
	}
}

func TestDecideOutbound_LegitimateCredentialsStillReachTheHost(t *testing.T) {
	withStubResolver(t, func(host string) ([]netip.Addr, error) {
		if host != "example.com" {
			t.Fatalf("host = %q, want example.com: userinfo must not reach resolution", host)
		}
		return mustAddrs(t, "93.184.216.34"), nil
	})

	// Stripping userinfo is a matching concern only. A credentialed URL that
	// breaks no rule must still be allowed through.
	decision, err := DecideOutbound(
		context.Background(),
		"https://alice:hunter2@example.com/report.pdf",
		[]*regexp2.Regexp{regexp2.MustCompile(`^https://example\.com(:[0-9]+)?(/|$)`, 0)},
		nil,
		time.Now().Add(5*time.Second),
		WithDenyPrivateIPs(true),
	)
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("credentialed URL matching the allow-list must pass, got: %v", err)
	}
	if !decision.Bypass {
		t.Fatalf("decision.Bypass = false, want true")
	}
}

func TestClampedBackoff(t *testing.T) {
	const (
		min = 1 * time.Second
		max = 30 * time.Second
	)

	retryAfter := func(status int, seconds string) *http.Response {
		return &http.Response{StatusCode: status, Header: http.Header{"Retry-After": []string{seconds}}}
	}

	for _, tc := range []struct {
		scenario string
		resp     *http.Response
		want     time.Duration
	}{
		{"429 with an hour is clamped", retryAfter(http.StatusTooManyRequests, "3600"), max},
		{"429 with a day is clamped", retryAfter(http.StatusTooManyRequests, "86400"), max},
		{"503 with an hour is clamped", retryAfter(http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "3600"), max},
		{"429 under the ceiling is honored", retryAfter(http.StatusTooManyRequests, "5"), 5 * time.Second},
		{"no response falls back to exponential", nil, min},
	} {
		t.Run(tc.scenario, func(t *testing.T) {
			got := ClampedBackoff(min, max, 0, tc.resp)
			if got != tc.want {
				t.Fatalf("ClampedBackoff = %s, want %s", got, tc.want)
			}
			if got > max {
				t.Fatalf("ClampedBackoff = %s, which exceeds max %s", got, max)
			}
		})
	}
}

// A negative max means the caller's budget is spent. The backoff must not
// return a negative duration, which would make the retry loop spin.
func TestClampedBackoff_NegativeMaxIsNotNegative(t *testing.T) {
	got := ClampedBackoff(1*time.Second, -5*time.Second, 0, nil)
	if got < 0 {
		t.Fatalf("ClampedBackoff = %s, want a non-negative duration", got)
	}
}

func TestNewOutboundHttpClient_NonPositiveTimeout(t *testing.T) {
	// Zero stays unbounded: the LibreOffice proxy owns its own lifetime and
	// passes it deliberately.
	if got := NewOutboundHttpClient(0, nil, nil, false).Timeout; got != 0 {
		t.Fatalf("timeout for 0 = %s, want 0", got)
	}

	// Negative means an expired budget. http.Client reads any non-positive
	// Timeout as no deadline at all, so it must not be passed through.
	if got := NewOutboundHttpClient(-5*time.Second, nil, nil, false).Timeout; got <= 0 {
		t.Fatalf("timeout for a negative budget = %s, want a positive value so the client fails closed", got)
	}
}

func TestDecideOutboundExpiredDeadline(t *testing.T) {
	// Patterns are matched under the fixed PatternMatchTimeout rather than
	// under the caller's remaining budget, so an expired deadline no longer
	// surfaces from the match itself. Every scheme must still fail closed,
	// including the ones that return before a host is resolved.
	expired := time.Now().Add(-time.Second)

	for _, rawURL := range []string{
		"https://example.com/",
		"file:///tmp/foo.html",
		"data:text/html,hello",
	} {
		_, err := DecideOutbound(context.Background(), rawURL, nil, nil, expired)
		if !errors.Is(err, context.DeadlineExceeded) {
			t.Fatalf("DecideOutbound(%q) with an expired deadline = %v, want context.DeadlineExceeded", rawURL, err)
		}
	}
}

func TestDecideOutboundBoundsCatastrophicPatterns(t *testing.T) {
	// A deny-list pattern that backtracks catastrophically, matched against a
	// client-controlled URL. Before PatternMatchTimeout the ceiling was the
	// caller's whole budget, so a 30s API_TIMEOUT bought a 30s CPU burn.
	// The trailing "!" makes the match fail only after the nested quantifier
	// has explored every way to split the run of "a"s.
	pattern := regexp2.MustCompile(`^https://example\.com/(a+)+$`, 0)
	pattern.MatchTimeout = PatternMatchTimeout

	rawURL := "https://example.com/" + strings.Repeat("a", 40) + "!"

	start := time.Now()
	_, err := DecideOutbound(
		context.Background(),
		rawURL,
		nil,
		[]*regexp2.Regexp{pattern},
		time.Now().Add(30*time.Second),
	)
	elapsed := time.Since(start)

	if err == nil {
		t.Fatal("expected an error from a catastrophic deny-list pattern")
	}

	// Generous headroom over the 250ms ceiling, still far below the 30s
	// deadline the match would otherwise have been allowed to consume.
	if elapsed > 5*time.Second {
		t.Fatalf("match took %s, want it aborted near PatternMatchTimeout (%s)", elapsed, PatternMatchTimeout)
	}
}